Serbia’s failure to open Cluster 3 in its EU accession negotiations is no reason for celebration. The decision reflects a far more troubling reality: the country’s continued democratic backsliding, deterioration in the rule of law, and persistent refusal to align its foreign policy with the European Union at a time
Srđan Majstorović
Serbia’s failure to open Cluster 3 in its EU accession negotiations is no reason for celebration. The decision reflects a far more troubling reality: the country’s continued democratic backsliding, deterioration in the rule of law, and persistent refusal to align its foreign policy with the European Union at a time when Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped Europe’s security environment.
The outcome also exposed the limits of regime’s political spin doctoring. Despite promises made to European leaders in Tivat and an intensive last-minute campaign designed to showcase “reform momentum,” the Serbian regime failed to convince sceptical Member States that meaningful progress had been achieved. Equally revealing was the inability of the European Commission to persuade the Council that the conditions for opening the cluster had been met. Ultimately, eight Member States concluded that formal legislative steps could not outweigh the broader political reality. The number of those who remain unconvinced of the regime’s genuine intentions may well be even greater. However, due to other considerations, geopolitical factors, or external pressures, they have chosen to ‘follow’ the majority within the Council.
The obvious question is: what lessons should be drawn?
The lesson for the Serbian regime
The first lesson should be that the era of simulated reforms has reached its limits. For more than a decade, the European Commission, the European Parliament, and numerous international organisations have documented concerns about Serbia’s democratic backsliding. Yet the authorities have largely responded with formal legislative changes while resisting reforms that would genuinely strengthen judicial independence, media freedom, institutional accountability and the rule of law.
This approach no longer appears credible in a growing number of EU capitals. The extent of democratic backsliding has become too visible to be concealed by carefully prepared reform narratives or diplomatic lobbying. Students, investigative journalists, civil society organisations and the pro-European opposition have all contributed to informing European policymakers and the wider public about developments inside Serbia.
The message from the Council is therefore clear: a growing number of member states no longer believe that a political system built on the concentration of control over state institutions, the economy, the security sector and much of the media can simultaneously deliver the democratic transformation required for EU membership.
Equally important is the foreign policy dimension. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine fundamentally changed the political context of enlargement. While candidate countries are not expected to agree with the EU on every issue, sustained refusal to align with the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy inevitably raises questions about Serbia’s strategic orientation.
Whether the government will draw these conclusions is another matter. Previous experience offers little reason for optimism. Critical assessments from European institutions have routinely been dismissed as politically motivated or “anti-Serbian,” while responsibility has been shifted onto external actors and domestic critics alike. There is little evidence that the latest setback will fundamentally alter that approach.
The lesson for the European Commission
The European Commission should also engage in serious reflection. Its institutional role is inherently difficult. It must assess candidates objectively while balancing the differing political positions of all 27 Member States. At the same time, it has sought to preserve the credibility of enlargement at a moment when the EU has compelling geopolitical reasons to keep the Western Balkans firmly anchored to the European project. Yet this episode demonstrates that geopolitical considerations cannot substitute for credible democratic progress.
By recommending the opening of Cluster 3 despite persistent concerns among Member States about the rule of law and Serbia’s foreign policy alignment, the Commission risked creating the impression that strategic considerations were beginning to outweigh the merit-based nature of the accession process. That perception was reinforced by reports that, while acknowledging the continued application of the “balance clause,” the Commission nevertheless argued that sufficient overall progress had been achieved to justify opening the cluster.
Whether or not that assessment was institutionally defensible, it weakened the Commission’s credibility among many pro-European citizens in Serbia who view the accession process primarily as a mechanism for democratic transformation rather than geopolitical stabilisation.
The Commission’s most important lesson is therefore that merit-based enlargement must remain firmly anchored in concrete results, not political expectations or future promises. Technical compliance cannot compensate for a broader loss of confidence in the direction of democratic development.
The Commission should also deepen its engagement with Serbian society. Recent outreach initiatives by the EU Delegation represent a welcome step, but much more is needed. If Brussels is perceived as communicating primarily with governments while paying insufficient attention to citizens defending democratic values, it risks alienating precisely those constituencies most committed to Serbia’s European future.
The lesson for Serbia’s citizens
For citizens protesting corruption, defending the rule of law and demanding stronger democratic institutions, the Council’s decision carries an important message. Recent public opinion research conducted separately by CEP and BCBP (both Belgrade based Think Tanks) indicates that support for EU membership remains particularly strong among citizens who support the student movement and pro-European opposition parties. Their commitment to European integration is rooted less in geopolitics than in values: independent institutions, accountable government, judicial independence and the rule of law. The Council’s decision demonstrates that these principles remain central to the accession process. Enlargement has not become a purely geopolitical exercise in which democratic standards no longer matter.
At the same time, citizens should harbour no illusions that Brussels can deliver democratic change on Serbia’s behalf. Sustainable reform will ultimately depend on domestic political engagement and the ability of Serbian society to build institutions that are independent, accountable and resilient. Nevertheless, allies matter. The insistence by eight Member States that standards remain a precondition for further progress sends an important signal that those advocating reform inside Serbia have not been forgotten.
The principal lesson is therefore twofold. Democratic change will ultimately be achieved by Serbia’s citizens themselves, but the EU accession process remains an important framework capable of supporting that transformation, provided it continues to reward genuine reforms rather than formal compliance.
If there is one conclusion that emerges from the Cluster 3 episode, it is that credibility has become the decisive currency of enlargement. Serbia’s government has lost it. The European Commission must work hard to preserve its own. And Serbia’s citizens have every reason to continue demanding the reforms that, simultaneously, remain the country’s surest path towards membership of the European Union.
Views expressed in the Opinion section belong to the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of European Western Balkans.
