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Will Britain follow Japan’s great growth gamble?

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has unveiled an expansionary economic blueprint aiming to break Japan’s long-standing cycle of stagnation through state-led investment, creating a precarious balancing act for the Bank of Japan as it attempts to maintain market confidence and monetary stability, says Helen Thomas A newly installed leader promises

  • Helen Thomas
  • July 28, 2026
  • 0 Comments

Tuesday 28 July 2026 8:12 am  |  Updated:  Tuesday 28 July 2026 8:13 am

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has unveiled an expansionary economic blueprint aiming to break Japan’s long-standing cycle of stagnation through state-led investment, creating a precarious balancing act for the Bank of Japan as it attempts to maintain market confidence and monetary stability, says Helen Thomas

A newly installed leader promises to break with the economic orthodoxy of the recent past by using the state to stimulate investment, improve productivity and raise the economy’s long-run growth potential, while simultaneously reassuring markets that public debt will remain sustainable. Sound familiar? Despite the obvious parallels with the UK, this is Japan, where Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, has unveiled her first annual economic blueprint, setting out an unapologetically reflationary vision for an economy that has spent much of the past three decades trapped between anaemic growth and deflation.

An ageing population, persistent deflation and the world’s largest public debt burden have produced policy prescriptions that would have seemed extraordinary almost anywhere else, from quantitative and qualitative easing to yield curve control and negative interest rates. But these unconventional policies were a harbinger of what was to come as other developed economies succumbed to similar challenges. Japan may once again be showing what comes next.

The attraction of Takaichi’s agenda is obvious. Faster growth offers the prospect of financing higher public spending without resorting to tax rises or spending cuts. The economic challenge is that markets have become considerably less willing to accept the promise that today’s borrowing will inevitably generate tomorrow’s prosperity.

An early draft of the blueprint referred to the Bank of Japan being “expected to coordinate closely with the government”, wording that immediately revived concerns about the independence of monetary policy given Takaichi’s previous criticism of interest rate increases during her campaign for the Liberal Democratic Party leadership. The reaction was swift, with renewed pressure on both the yen and Japanese government bonds as markets questioned whether the institutional separation between fiscal and monetary policy might gradually be eroded.

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The final version of the document sought to calm those fears by removing the controversial wording and including a footnote referring to the statutory requirement to respect the Bank of Japan’s independence. While that undoubtedly represented an important reassurance, it did little to alter the broader direction of policy. Indeed, the blueprint itself represents a marked departure from the more cautious fiscal language employed by Takaichi’s predecessor. Last year’s emphasis on “fiscal consolidation” has disappeared entirely, replaced by a programme that explicitly prioritises long-term public investment and allows greater flexibility around achieving primary budget surpluses, provided the overall debt-to-GDP ratio is ultimately placed on a declining path.

That distinction is more significant than it first appears. A commitment to achieving a primary surplus imposes an immediate constraint upon fiscal policy by requiring governments to finance current spending largely from current revenues. By contrast, targeting the debt-to-GDP ratio implicitly assumes that sufficiently strong economic growth will eventually offset the additional borrowing undertaken today. The blueprint therefore rests upon an optimistic assessment of the returns from state-led investment, envisaging public and private investment of ¥370 trillion across 17 strategic sectors by 2040, alongside a separate investment framework financed through “temporary” government bonds that will not be subject to conventional expenditure ceilings. The expectation is that these measures will lift Japan’s long-run growth rate to one per cent while substantially increasing productivity.

The widow-maker

Whether those ambitions prove achievable is ultimately less important than the challenge they create for the Bank of Japan. Under conventional macroeconomic theory, a more expansionary fiscal stance would ordinarily imply a tighter monetary stance if inflationary pressures are to remain contained. Yet Japan is not operating under ordinary circumstances. Government debt already exceeds 230 per cent of GDP, while the central bank has only recently begun the long and delicate process of normalising monetary policy after years of extraordinary intervention in financial markets. Every increase in interest rates may be justified on macroeconomic grounds, but each also increases debt servicing costs and risks further weakening a government bond market that has already undergone a remarkable repricing.

Few trades acquired a more infamous reputation than betting against Japanese government bonds. The “widow-maker” reflected decades in which deflation, quantitative easing and deep domestic demand for government debt rendered Japan’s extraordinary debt burden largely irrelevant to market pricing. That era is ending. Interest rates have risen to one per cent, inflation has returned and the ten-year yield is at a thirty-year high. For the first time in decades, Japan’s debt dynamics are no longer being overwhelmed by monetary policy.

The yen tells much the same story. Decades of ultra-low interest rates have left Japan with one of the widest policy differentials against the United States, helping to drive the currency to its weakest levels in decades. Even the US Treasury has argued in its latest semi-annual Currency Report that “[Japanese] Monetary policy normalisation would help anchor inflation expectations and reduce excessive exchange rate volatility. Yet the very tightening that might strengthen the yen also risks unsettling the government bond market. The Bank of Japan therefore finds itself in the unenviable position of choosing between currency stability and financial stability, just as the government adopts a more expansionary fiscal stance.

Britain is not Japan, but neither can it afford to dismiss Japan’s experience as unique. If anything, the UK’s greater dependence on overseas investors may leave it even more exposed to the bond vigilantes. The underlying dilemma is increasingly familiar: governments want faster growth without fiscal retrenchment, while central banks must preserve both price stability and market confidence. Japan has spent two decades testing the limits of unconventional monetary policy. It may now be testing the limits of fiscal activism instead.

Helen Thomas is founder and CEO of Blonde Money

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