The Future of EU (Enlargement) Is Already Being Written in Montenegro

The future of EU enlargement is already being written in Montenegro. Not simply because Montenegro is likely to become the next member state, nor because it is the most advanced candidate country in the Western Balkans. It is because Montenegro has repeatedly become the laboratory for the European Union’s evolving enlargement policy.

It was the first candidate to negotiate under the “fundamentals first” approach that placed the rule of law at the center of the accession process. It was the first to operate under the system of interim benchmarks. It was the first to receive a positive IBAR. Today, it is also the only candidate country for which the EU has established an ad hoc working group to prepare the accession treaty.

This is not merely evidence that Montenegro is approaching the finish line. It suggests something more important: that Montenegro is becoming the place where the European Union tests how enlargement should function in an era shaped by both geopolitical urgency and concerns about democratic resilience.

And the timing could hardly be more consequential. For years, Brussels has insisted that enlargement is a geopolitical necessity. Russia’s war against Ukraine has only reinforced the argument that bringing aspiring democracies into the European family is a strategic imperative. Yet many member states remain reluctant to embrace enlargement fully, haunted by a persistent concern: what if new members backslide on democracy and the rule of law once they are inside the Union?

For more than a decade, supporters of enlargement have been losing this argument. Not because the geopolitical case for enlargement has weakened, but because sceptics can point to examples within the Union itself where democratic backsliding has proven difficult to prevent and even harder to reverse. The challenge is no longer whether candidate countries can reform before accession. It is whether those reforms can endure afterwards.

This tension between geopolitical necessity and democratic credibility now lies at the heart of the enlargement debate. Candidate countries are told that reforms will be rewarded. At the same time, the EU keeps searching for safeguards against future democratic erosion.

The challenge facing the Union is therefore no longer whether it should enlarge. It is how. Getting that answer right is critical not only for enlargement itself, but also for the future of European democracy. Enlargement remains one of the European Union’s most successful transformative policies. Preserving that success requires adapting it to new realities.

The model that guided previous rounds of accession rested on a relatively straightforward assumption: candidate countries undertake reforms before accession and once membership is granted, democratic standards become largely self-sustaining. The experience of the last two decades has shown that assumption to be overly optimistic.

Concerns about democratic backsliding have fundamentally altered the politics of enlargement. The debate is no longer only about whether candidates fulfil accession criteria. It is increasingly about whether reforms will survive accession.

Some responses to this concern have been misguided. Recent proposals suggesting that future member states could face certain restrictions risk undermining one of the European Union’s foundational principles: equality among member states.

The problem is not only the substance of such proposals. It is the message they send. After spending decades in the Union’s waiting room, the countries of the Western Balkans cannot reasonably be expected to accept a future of diminished membership. Full membership must mean full membership.

Equality is not only a question of voting rights, institutional participation or access to EU policies. It also concerns the recognition of the identities that member states bring into the Union. One of the European Union’s greatest achievements has been its ability to reconcile political integration with the preservation of national identity and diversity. Equality among member states also means equality of languages, cultures and constitutional traditions.

As Montenegro moves towards membership, recognizing Montenegrin as an official language of the European Union should not be viewed as a concession but as a natural expression of the very principles on which the Union is built. The strength of Europe has never come from uniformity. It comes from ensuring that every member joins as an equal while remaining fully itself.

The answer to the EU’s dilemma therefore lies elsewhere: in rethinking the role of accession treaties. For too long, accession treaties have been treated primarily as technical instruments that formalize membership once negotiations are complete. In reality, they could become something far more important: a bridge between pre-accession conditionality and post-accession compliance.

The European Union already possesses a broad range of instruments designed to protect the rule of law and democratic governance. The problem is not the absence of safeguards. It is the uncertainty surrounding when they are triggered, how they are applied and whether sufficient political consensus exists to use them effectively. In other words, the weakness lies less in the instruments themselves than in the conditions governing their application.

This is where Montenegro’s accession presents a unique opportunity. Rather than creating new forms of differentiated membership, the EU should use accession treaties to define clearly and transparently how core democratic commitments will continue to be protected after accession while preserving full political equality from day one. The objective should not be to create new obligations, but to make existing commitments more credible, predictable and enforceable.

Future accession treaties could contain precisely defined safeguard clauses linked to the rule of law, judicial independence and democratic governance. More importantly, they could establish in advance who assesses compliance, which indicators trigger corrective action, what measures can be applied and under what conditions those measures are lifted.

Financial conditionality deserves particular attention. The European Union has already begun linking access to European funds with respect for rule-of-law standards. Future accession treaties should go further. They should specify in advance which violations trigger consequences, which institutions are responsible for assessment, which financial instruments may be affected and what steps are required for corrective measures to be lifted.

The goal should not be punishment. It should be predictability. A country entering the European Union should know exactly which commitments continue to apply after accession and exactly what consequences follow if those commitments are breached. Existing member states, in turn, should know that enlargement does not depend on blind trust or political goodwill, but on clearly defined and mutually accepted rules.

In this sense, the accession treaty would cease to be merely the final chapter of enlargement negotiations. It would become the missing link between the transformative power of conditionality before accession and the credibility of enforcement afterwards.

Montenegro is uniquely positioned to pioneer this shift. Unlike previous enlargement rounds, Montenegro is negotiating at a moment when the European Union is simultaneously rethinking enlargement and confronting the lessons of democratic backsliding within its own borders. The country has already shaped key innovations in the accession process. It could now help shape the next one: transforming accession treaties from technical closing documents into instruments that strengthen the resilience of European democracy itself.

The implications extend far beyond Montenegro. The next wave of enlargement is likely to include not only the Western Balkans, but also Ukraine and Moldova. The question facing the European Union is therefore not whether Montenegro alone is ready for membership. It is whether Europe can develop an enlargement framework capable of remaining credible both before and after accession.

The answer to that question may well begin in Montenegro. What is currently being prepared is not only the legal framework for one country’s accession. It will become the blueprint for how future enlargements are negotiated, safeguarded and sustained. At a time when Europe needs both stronger democracies and greater geopolitical cohesion, that would be a significant contribution to the European project.

Nor would it be the first time that Montenegro helped shape a larger European story.

The article has been prepared within the project “The 3 R’s of EU Integration – Rule of Law, Resilience, and Reform”, implemented by the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM Albania). Supported by a grant from Open Society Institute – Sofia Foundation (OSIS) with the support of Open Society Foundations (OSFs). Responsibility for the contents and views expressed in the publication therein lies entirely with the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM Albania) and in no way can be construed as reflecting the official position of OSIS, OSFs or any affiliated entities.