BELGRADE – In the first half of 2026, Serbia remained at around 60% alignment with the European Union’s (EU) foreign policy declarations and measures, according to a new analysis by the Belgrade-based ISAC Fund. Despite nominal progress achieved in 2025, when Serbia reached 67% alignment, the percentage has declined once
EWB
BELGRADE – In the first half of 2026, Serbia remained at around 60% alignment with the European Union’s (EU) foreign policy declarations and measures, according to a new analysis by the Belgrade-based ISAC Fund. Despite nominal progress achieved in 2025, when Serbia reached 67% alignment, the percentage has declined once again.
Between 1 January and 30 June, 2026, the EU adopted 60 declarations inviting candidate and partner countries to align with them. Serbia aligned itself with 36 declarations and the accompanying measures, while it did not align with 24.
According to ISAC, this level of alignment remains the lowest among EU candidate countries actively engaged in accession negotiations. The only candidate countries with a lower level of alignment are Turkey and Georgia. Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Ukraine recorded 100% alignment, while Moldova’s alignment stood at 90%.
“However, as noted in previous ISAC reports on alignment, these percentages are primarily descriptive indicators reflecting general trends and cannot be regarded as a definitive measure of progress or regression. Far more important are the specific issues on which candidate countries and partners choose not to align,” the statement adds.
As in previous years, Serbia continued to refrain from aligning with the majority of declarations and measures directly or indirectly related to the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, including those concerning their nationals, entities, or interests. Officially, one of the main justifications for this position remains the issue of Kosovo, as Serbia continues to seek the support of Russia and China in various international forums, most notably at the United Nations.
In addition, Serbia did not align with declarations and measures concerning other issues, although in most cases they were in some way linked to Russia, China, and the armed conflict launched by Russia in Ukraine.
On the other hand, Serbia did align with declarations containing restrictive measures targeting individuals and/or entities associated with the following countries or issues: Haiti, Mali, North Korea, Sudan (two declarations), Guatemala, Venezuela, Myanmar/Burma, Tunisia, Syria, Iran (four declarations), the Ukrainian regions under Russian occupation, sanctions against the former Ukrainian leadership, the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, counterterrorism (two declarations), Hamas/Palestinian Islamic Jihad (two declarations), Zimbabwe, and Moldova.
As for the EU’s political declarations (those that do not contain restrictive measures), Serbia aligned itself with declarations relating to the commemoration of important international dates (three declarations), the situation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iran, Israel, the situation between Israel and Lebanon, Sudan, the presidential elections in Armenia, Myanmar/Burma, the situation in the Middle East, and the ceasefire between Iran and the United States.
