Discussions in Brussels on the possible opening of Cluster 3 in Serbia’s accession negotiations have once again placed the European Union before a test of its own credibility. The arguments in favour of such a decision are familiar. Serbia, it is said, should not be left behind at a time
Srđan Majstorović
Discussions in Brussels on the possible opening of Cluster 3 in Serbia’s accession negotiations have once again placed the European Union before a test of its own credibility. The arguments in favour of such a decision are familiar. Serbia, it is said, should not be left behind at a time when Montenegro, Albania, Moldova and Ukraine are moving forward. The European Commission’s assessment that Serbia has technically met the opening benchmarks for Cluster 3 remains valid. Finally, Belgrade has taken steps to amend the controversial judicial laws, which some interpret as a sign of renewed willingness to cooperate.
At first glance, these arguments may appear pragmatic. Under closer scrutiny, however, they reveal a dangerous misunderstanding of both the state of democracy in Serbia and the logic of the accession process itself.
The progress of other candidate countries cannot serve as an argument for advancing Serbia’s negotiations. Enlargement is not a regional balancing exercise, nor should it become a diplomatic mechanism for compensating one candidate country because others have moved ahead. If Montenegro, Albania, Moldova or Ukraine are making progress, this only shows that the accession process can still function when reforms are genuinely pursued. It does not change the fact that Serbia has been stagnating and, in several fundamental areas, backsliding for years.
This regression is not accidental. Serbia’s political leadership knows very well what is expected from a candidate country. The rule of law, the independence of institutions, media freedom, academic freedom, the fight against organised crime and corruption, and alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy are not new requirements. They are the very basis of the accession process. Yet for years, the authorities in Belgrade have pursued policies that run counter to these commitments, while continuing to use the language of European integration when politically convenient.
The revised enlargement methodology and Serbia’s negotiating framework are clear: the overall pace of negotiations must depend on progress in the fundamentals. This is not a technical detail, but the core safeguard of the credibility of the process. The balance clause exists precisely to prevent progress in individual clusters from concealing stagnation or regression in the rule of law and democratic governance. If there is no credible progress in fundamentals, there can be no credible progress in negotiations as a whole.
This is why opening Cluster 3 under the current circumstances would not be a neutral technical step. It would send a political message that the EU is ready to disregard the very principles it has built into the accession process in order to achieve a short-term diplomatic result.
Cluster 3 covers competitiveness and inclusive growth, including areas such as information society and media, taxation, social policy and employment, education and culture. It is unrealistic to expect that opening this cluster would somehow improve the situation in the media, universities or education system in Serbia. On the contrary, it would reward the authorities at a moment when these sectors are under serious pressure and when the space for independent voices, professional standards and critical thinking has been shrinking.
The argument that the recent revisions of judicial legislation represent progress is equally problematic. If a government first adopts laws that weaken safeguards for judicial and prosecutorial independence, faces strong domestic and international criticism, and then partially retreats, this cannot be treated as reform progress in the substantive meaning of the word. At best, it is an attempt to return to the previous state of play. Presenting such a reversal as an achievement would be a cynical interpretation of conditionality.
Serbia today is marked by captured institutions, a distorted media environment, pressure on independent actors, intimidation of critics and the normalisation of practices incompatible with democratic governance. In such an atmosphere, acting as if the accession process can continue as business as usual would be a grave mistake. It would further erode the credibility of the European Union among citizens who still believe that European integration should mean the transformation of the state, not merely the management of relations with the government of the day.
Opening Cluster 3 would not encourage citizens in Serbia who genuinely support a European future. It would do the opposite. It would strengthen the perception that the EU is willing to overlook democratic decline if it believes this serves a broader geopolitical purpose. It would provide political relief to a regime that has long abandoned the substance of EU accession while keeping its form alive for external consumption.
Such a decision would also send a discouraging message to candidate countries undertaking difficult and politically costly reforms. If genuine reform efforts and political concessions to illiberal practices produce similar outcomes, then the merit-based nature of the enlargement process is devalued. The EU cannot simultaneously insist that enlargement is based on strict conditionality and then weaken that conditionality when it becomes politically inconvenient.
Particularly problematic is the paternalistic attitude sometimes present among well-meaning international actors who argue that Serbia should be encouraged in view of the broader geopolitical context. This perspective too often overlooks the daily reality of Serbian citizens. Diplomatic postings last several years; the consequences of captured institutions, systemic pressure and democratic decline are lived by citizens every day. Their expectations are not abstract. They want to live in a functioning, predictable and democratic state in which their children will not have to leave in order to have a future.
There is currently no consensus among EU Member States on opening Cluster 3 with Serbia. That absence of consensus should not be treated as an obstacle to be overcome through diplomatic pressure, but as a necessary warning. Member States that insist on the integrity of the accession framework are not blocking enlargement. They are defending the only enlargement policy that can still produce democratic transformation.
The European Union has often said that enlargement is a geopolitical investment. That is true. But geopolitics cannot be separated from democracy, the rule of law and institutional integrity. A larger Union will not be stronger if it imports unresolved democratic deficits or rewards governments that undermine the very principles on which the Union is based.
Serbia’s accession process should move forward when Serbia demonstrates credible, measurable and sustained progress in the fundamentals. Until then, opening Cluster 3 would not be an incentive for reform. It would be a political concession to those who have actively undermined reform.
Only an enlargement process firmly rooted in democratic principles can make the European Union stronger, more resilient and more credible. It would also send the right message to the citizens of Serbia: that they have not been abandoned, that their struggle for democracy is seen, and that the European future of Serbia depends not on tactical deals with those in power, but on the values the accession process was designed to protect.
Views expressed in the Opinion section belong to the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of European Western Balkans.
