New data shows EU’s ‘Dublin’ asylum relocation was better than its unfair reputation

Next Friday (12 June), the EU’s Dublin system will come to an end as the new Pact on Migration and Asylum officially enters into force. 

For years, the Dublin system has been a familiar villain in the debate on Europe’s asylum policy.

Designed to determine which EU country is responsible for examining an asylum application, it has been widely denounced as fundamentally unfair.

Critics have pointed to its core principle — that responsibility lies primarily with the first country of entry — as evidence that it systematically disadvantages southern European states.

Yet, northern countries have also expressed frustration, as asylum seekers often move onward after arriving in southern Europe.

Meanwhile, central and eastern European states have resisted proposals for mandatory relocations, citing concerns over sovereignty.

The result has been a rare consensus over EU asylum policy: nearly everyone agreed that something was wrong — though not for the same reasons.

This broad dissatisfaction helped drive reforms. From June 2026, the EU’s new pact will introduce a solidarity mechanism designed to provide additional support for (southern) member states experiencing high migratory pressure.

Yet, despite the formal end of the Dublin system, its underlying logic remains largely intact. Responsibility will still hinge, at least initially, on where asylum seekers first enter the Union.

Given this continuity, it is essential to revisit the assumptions that have underpinned years of criticism. What if the Dublin system, for all its flaws, has not performed as poorly as its reputation suggests?

The impact of Dublin transfers 

Recent empirical analysis offers a surprising answer.

Examining more than half a million recorded Dublin transfers between 2008 and 2024, we found that the system has in fact contributed to a slightly fairer distribution of responsibility for asylum seekers in the EU.

While this does not address fairness toward migrants, it shows that transfers improving the fair distribution among states outnumbered those that worsened it by roughly two to one. 

This finding runs counter to the dominant narrative. If responsibility is assigned to first-entry countries, shouldn’t transfers — particularly those that return asylum seekers to border states — intensify pressure on the EU’s periphery? The answer lies in how the system has functioned in practice, rather than how it was designed on paper.

In reality, many asylum seekers moved on from their initial countries of arrival within the EU, often heading towards northern and western member states.

In this context, Dublin transfers did not simply reverse the dynamic.

Transfers were often halted by court interventions or only selectively accepted by member states, which argued that they were already hosting large numbers of asylum seekers.

In practice, this shifted responsibilities — at least to some extent — away from member states facing particularly high migratory pressure. Member states under less pressure ultimately assumed a greater share of responsibilities for asylum seekers. 

The outcome was not a perfectly fair system for member states.

However, neither did it systematically disadvantage southern member states, nor leave northern member states solely responsible for those who had moved onward.

Importantly, this balancing effect was not the result of a carefully engineered system; rather, it emerged largely from the practices of member states themselves. 

None of this is to suggest that the Dublin system was beyond criticism.

A significant proportion of Dublin transfers was effectively ‘zero-sum’, meaning that they merely shifted responsibility from one country to another without achieving meaningful redistribution.

Moreover, the system could entail significant human costs, as asylum seekers were transferred across borders, often against their preferences. 

Yet there is a clear gap between perception and actual outcomes. This has important implications for the new pact.

It renders transfers of asylum seekers back to their point of entry in the EU all but mandatory. At the same time, the solidarity mechanism formalises how states are expected to support one another when significant migratory pressure arises. The objectives are clear: asylum seekers should no longer be able to move freely from one member state to another, and responsibilities should be shared more fairly among states.   

However, formalising the rules carries its own risks.

What if the return of asylum seekers to their point of entry is implemented rigorously, while the solidarity measures are applied only selectively?

At the end of last year, the EU Commission identified six member states that are exempt from contributing to the solidarity measures and 16 that are eligible for some form of solidarity support.

This means that relatively few member states are likely to carry most of the responsibility for the solidarity measures. The design of the pact may therefore create new opportunities for shifting and shirking responsibilities, rather than genuinely balancing them.

The key lesson is that any system must be grounded in a clear understanding of how it actually functions. Greater transparency could help achieve it.

By systematically including the transfers of asylum seekers in its assessment on how responsibilities are distributed within the EU, the commission could contribute to a more accurate and comprehensive picture — and ultimately increase fairness between member states.  

The Dublin system shows that policies should not be judged solely by their objectives, however noble they may be. What truly matters are the outcomes.

It is not enough to assume that greater fairness will be achieved simply because the EU’s asylum policy now includes a solidarity mechanism. Fairness must be realised through concrete contributions and a genuine willingness to achieve it.