The article was originally published in Serbian at Savremena politika. The public opinion surveys, conducted recently by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCBP) and the Centre for Research, Transparency and Accountability (Crta), have clearly pointed to the link between support for Serbia’s European integration and opposition to the current
Marija Stojanović
The article was originally published in Serbian at Savremena politika.
The public opinion surveys, conducted recently by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCBP) and the Centre for Research, Transparency and Accountability (Crta), have clearly pointed to the link between support for Serbia’s European integration and opposition to the current government. According to BCBP, two-thirds of citizens who support EU membership do not support the current government, while one-fourth of government supporters are in favour of the country’s accession to the Union.
Meanwhile, according to Crta’s findings, 75 per cent of respondents who declared themselves voters of the Student List – currently the largest opposition force in the country – are in favor of closer ties with the EU, while only 15 per cent of supporters of the Serbian Progressive Party share the same view about the EU.
At the same time, as many as 60 per cent of SNS voters believe that Serbia should strengthen ties with Russia, while 10 per cent of the voters of the Student List advocate it.
Commenting on these findings, the interlocutors of Savremena politika note that official Brussels should revise its attitude towards Serbia.
However, they stress that it does not imply that the EU should take sides in the political turmoil in the country, but that it should insist more consistently on essential principles, such as the rule of law, the fight against corruption and media freedom.
“The recent findings by BCBP and Crta suggest that a majority of Serbian citizens are informed and wise. And also, that they do count on the EU to maintain its merit-based policy. The later has often been ambiguous vis-a-vis Serbia over the past years with a view to ensuring its stability. The result has been an unstable Serbia, undermining Western Balkans stability and trust in the EU”, says Pierre Mirel, Former Director of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Enlargement.
Bojana Selaković, Coordinator of the National Convention on the EU, states that the results of these surveys show that the political map of Serbia today is different from what various propaganda centers are trying to prove.
“We have now also received confirmation that support for European integration is less and less a matter of traditional political divisions, and more and more a matter of the relation towards the rule of law, the functioning of institutions and democratic values. At the same time, the electorate that supports the current government to a greater extent accepts the narrative of reliance on Russia and balancing policy, although now President Vučić should explain to them the shift from Russia to America”, Selaković states.
Speaking on the same topic, Marko Savković, Senior Advisor at the Center for International and Security Affairs (ISAC Fund), remarks that these public opinion surveys are important, as they show that pro-EU sentiment is widespread in Serbian society, i.e. that the “reservoir” of support is deeper than the simple “yes or no” question indicates.
“The EU accession process is not the property of any government, nor a political party”
According to the analysts, the fact that some EU member states have not given the green light for Serbia to open Cluster 3 suggests that the approach towards Serbia is already somewhat different, i.e. that the EU increasingly insists on legal and democratic principles, and not exclusively on the fulfilment of technical criteria.
The European Commission recommended that EU member states approve the opening of Cluster 3 earlier this month, but at least seven countries opposed it, citing the state of the rule of law and Serbia’s insufficient alignment with EU foreign policy, including non-imposing sanctions on Russia, as the main reasons for it.
“Contrary to what has been stated by some SNS leaders, the lack of EU consensus on the opening of cluster 3 is not a political choice but the very respect of the Imbalance clause, enshrined in the accession negotiation criteria by the European Commission in 2011. Changing the current EU approach would affect its credibility further and be considered a treason of its values and principles, as well as of the citizens who believe in Serbia’s membership”, Pierre Mirrel remarks.
Bojana Selakovic stresses that the European Union should not choose a side in Serbia’s internal political conflicts.
“European integration must remain a common social project, not merely a part of the agendas of political parties. Therefore, it is important that the EU continues to develop relations not only with government institutions, but also with parliament, local governments, civil society, media, business community, academic and scientific community. The accession process is not the property of any government, nor a political party, but a process that belongs to the whole society”, she underlines.
Selaković notes that this is precisely why the government’s attempt to present itself as almost the only legitimate interlocutor of the European Union is problematic, while any direct EU relation with other social actors is often presented as interference in Serbia’s internal affairs.
“Civil society organizations, independent media and other critical actors have been exposed to discrediting campaigns for years. This has been particularly striking over the past year and a half. In communication with European partners, the government often tries to present the protests as a result of Russian influence or an attempt to destabilize Serbia, while at the same time describing them to the domestic public as a ‘colour revolution’, organized and supported by the European Union and other Western actors. Such dual communication shows that European integration is used as an instrument of daily politics, instead of being a space of social consensus”, Bojana Selaković remarks.
Selaković claims that, having all these facts in mind, the EU should change its approach, “not by supporting certain political actors, but by insisting more consistently on the principles on which the enlargement policy is based”.
“For years, the assumption prevailed that political stability, even at the cost of democratic backsliding, would contribute to European integration. Today, it is clear that such an approach did not yield the expected results – Serbia is neither closer to EU membership, nor has it become more resistant to the influences of other international actors. The EU should, therefore, demonstrate much more clearly that its support is not directed to any specific government or a party, but to the citizens of Serbia and the reforms they expect to be implemented,“ Bojana Selaković says.
Selaković concludes that this implies “a more consistent application of the principle of conditionality, a clearer reaction when the rule of law collapses and continuous cooperation with all social actors who contribute to the democratization of the country, as only in this way can European integration become a common goal of society again, and not an instrument of political legitimacy of any government”.
Marko Savkovic says that the precondition for the “correction” of the EU policy towards Serbia should be an agreement between the member states, although it does not seem very realistic.
“It may be unrealistic to expect from EU members, faced with a multitude of problems and crises, to worry about what the political alternative to the current government in Serbia exactly wants and plans to do. These countries know very well who is in power in Serbia, i.e. to whom they talk, but, of course, such an approach could change as the election approaches. There are also some EU member states, such as Sweden and Holland, and now we see some more, which have taken the position that there can be no progress on the EU path due to the state of the rule of law in Serbia. Also, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos, insists on this in several statements, and she is ready to meet with, let’s assume, student representatives. But skepticism is still present, i.e. the famous question ‘why there are no EU flags (at the protests in Serbia) ’”, Savković remarks.
